Unfortunately, severe economic conditions dramatically changed the political landscape for Benjedid. A dramatic economic downturn in Algeria in 1984 and 1985 (prompted mostly by fluctuations in global oil prices as well economic mismanagement at the national level) led to scattered protests around the nation. A growing undercurrent of political opposition was becoming more vocal and more visible. Opposition political forces (including newly organized fundamentalist organizations) were becoming more and more popular outside of their traditional student bases. Riots became increasingly violent and more frequent. In response to these riots Benjedid initiated a reform program which attempted to remove entrenched political elites from the Boumedienne era. He also took steps towards moving Algeria away from socialist national centralization and towards a more free-market oriented economy. However, many of these reforms were not enacted quickly enough to satisfy the demands of different opposing factions.

In October of 1988, Algeria was rocked by a series of additional massive riots. In response to these riots, the military cracked down and a state of emergency was imposed. In an effort to stem the violence and bring opposition parties into the fold, Benjedid proposed a new constitution that reduced the political stranglehold the FLN had on power. This Constitution, which was passed in February of 1989, was in theory supposed to reduce the role of the military as well as permit the formation of opposition political parties. While many secular parties were mired in sectionalized interest and infighting, the FIS, a radical fundamentalist political party, was developing an enormous grassroots following. FIS quickly became a monolithic political powerhouse in Algeria. The FIS openly supported a rerun to Islamic shari'a law and a state run by core fundamentalist vales. It was vehemently against Berbers, Marxists, and secular forms of government.

In December 1991, Algerians voted in what were the first national parliamentary elections held in 30 years. In the first round of voting 5790 candidates from 37 different political parties competed for 231 seats out of a total of 430. The second round of voting was to be held in January to fill the remaining seats. Algiers Radio broadcast the official results as reported by the Constitutional Council. The FIS had won 188 seats while the FFS (a second socialist party) had won 25 seats and the FLN had won an embarrassing 15 seats. As a result of this stunning loss, on January 11^th of 1992, President Bendjedid was forced to resign by the military and secular elite. The following day, the second round of elections was cancelled. A High Committee was established and Mohammed Boudiaf named as the new Algerian president. The FIS was outlawed and thousands of FIS supporters were placed in prisons.

Since the cancelled election of 1992, the FIS had become a more paramilitary organization engaging in violent activities against the government and secular interests. In ways somewhat similar to the IRA and the PLO, the outlawing of the political FIS led to the formation of a more armed wing of the party: the AIS. Other armed paramilitary fundamentalist groups such as the GIA exploded on the scene after the events of 1992. Massacres of entire families and towns became commonplace in Algeria during the 1990's. The government essentially had a disorganized civil war on its hands; a roving armed collective of fundamentalist guerillas. While the military has been actively fighting these groups, there is still some concern that the broader population is loosing confidence in the ability of the state to protect them.
The Birth of Islamic Fundamentalism in Algeria
The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria did not itself begin in earnest until the beginning of the 1980's. From the outset, it is important to clearly define what I mean when using the term "fundamentalist." Given that this term is often used very loosely and with definitive negative connotations, it is important to delineate what and who is actually being referred to.

Algeria has, since independence, wrestled with the relationship between Islam and the state. Even though the majority of elites, including the military, consider themselves to be Muslim, the government still retains a very secularist flavor. Algeria has, since independence, also struggled with some coherent notion of its national identity. While the government has generally, over time, turned to a policy of Arabization to generate a particular Arabic view of national identity, it has not necessarily followed with a similar Islamization policy. Certainly the government has funded a variety of Islamic interests over the years. However, the military and secular elite have been vary wary about bringing Islamic law into the drafting of state law. Much like Egypt, the nation may be Muslim, but the government is secular.

When I am speaking about fundamentalism within the context of Algeria, I am referring to organizations that wish to overturn the secular authority and replace the law of man with the law of God. They wish to see Islamic law become the basis for the system of laws throughout the country. Everyone would be subject to sha'ria law. Gambling and alcohol would be banned, women would be relegated to very traditional roles, and other secular and religious institutions would be bound by the rule of Islam.

While the FLN and the revolutionaries from the 50's and 60's were militant Muslims, they were not