fundamentalists under this rubric. In fact, we don't really see the beginnings of a serious fundamentalist movement in Algeria until at least the late 70's and early 80's. However, once it does take a foothold, fundamentalism develops rapidly among the population to become the dominant opposition political movement by the early 1990's.

So, why does Islamic fundamentalism catch on in Algeria and spread so thoroughly in a matter of several years? How does a movement go from a handful of dedicated student radicals to a national political phenomena in one decade? One obvious explanation for the rise of fundamentalism during the early 1980's is strictly generational. A new generation of Arab youth viewed the older FLN power elite as corrupt and westernized:

"fundamentalism flows from the belief that the nationalist leaders who led their countries to independence after World War II did not deliver to most people the better lives they promised; they and their foreign ideologies had failed. This perception of failure cut to a considerable extent across generational lines. As older people rested on the laurels of victories past, younger people were looking for victories over present problems which their leaders seemed unable or unwilling to produce. Their dissatisfaction was reinforced by the fact that slow economic growth limited their upward mobility." (Ruedy, 1992 p.241).

Fundamentalist students believed that the secular elite had bee corrupted by Marxist and Socialist ideologies. Since the only real opposition groups on university campuses were Marxists and Socialists, many Muslim students turned away from secular political organizations altogether in favor of a more purist approach. Western influences had tainted the revolution against the colonial oppressors. A return to pure Islamic law was necessary to reinvigorate the revolution.

While one major force working to stimulate fundamentalism was generational and political, the other was economic. The older generation's socialist economic policies were bankrupt in the eyes of these fundamentalists. Massive unemployment coupled with the alienation of rapid urbanization left many Islamic youth bewildered and frustrated (Ruedy, 1992 p.241). At the same time, because the mosque had become the only outlet for this frustration (given that dissenting political parties were banned) it was natural that the leaders of such opposition groups would come from the Islamic clergy.

By 1979 Algeria had already witnessed fundamentalists students clashing with Berberist and Marxist factions on university campuses across the country (Ruedy, 1992 p.241). Fundamentalist students increasingly began to intimidate and harass female students who did not behave or dress in accord with strict Islamic custom. Institutions that served alcohol, such as cafes and bars, were targeted by fundamentalists for vandalism and looting. Two of the key leaders responsible for spreading the movement beyond just the schools were Shaykh Abdelatif Sultani and Shaykh Ahmed Sahnouin. These two became the organizers and theoretical scholars behind the fundamentalist da'wa organization (Ruedy, 1992 p.241).

By 1981 fundamentalist organizers began to organize informal mosques at various places around town. Moderate clerics who had been supported into power by the secular establishment were chastised and evicted from their mosques. New fundamentalist spiritual leaders, who opposed the secular rule of law and the imposition of western ideology, began to gain prominence. By 1982 a definitive and vocal fundamentalist following was calling for the dismantling of the current constitution and the imposition of strict Islamic law throughout Algeria. These forces demanded that a new government be formed which would, among other things, prohibit alcohol and ban women form secondary and higher education (Ruedy, 1992 p.242).

The increasingly vocal nature of fundamentalist groups on university campuses led to violent clashes with leftists and Berbers in October of 1982. In November of that year a group of fundamentalists killed a leftist student at a suburban Algiers campus. The result was a full-scale police crackdown and the arrest of over 400 fundamentalist organizers. However, in response to these arrests, over 100,000 Muslim demonstrators took to the streets and marched on the downtown campus (Ruedy, 1992 p.242). The local and national authorities were simply "astounded" by the political outpouring of these protestors. They had never imagined that the fundamentalist following would have been so large.

In fact, this point really marks the arrival of fundamentalism onto the scene as a viable and powerful political force. Many believed this growing fundamentalist challenge to be the greatest threat to the regime since its independence from France (Ruedy, 1992 p.242). In response to this growing threat to the secular elite, hundreds more fundamentalist leaders and organizers form across the nation were jailed. However, in an effort to placate fundamentalist fervor, many of these leaders were released early in 1983