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by Michael Winship
In my madcap, misspent youth, while working on a presidential campaign a friend and I discovered it was remarkably easy to become a New York State election inspector. All it required was filling out a form and being deputized by some legal type.
On Primary Day, armed with official ID, we dashed around like irritating Junior G-Men, making sure the polling places were open on time, electioneering was kept 500 feet away and that sound trucks blaring the virtues of various candidates were properly out of earshot. Hey, it was upstate New York: you make your fun with what you find.
Today, though, to be an effective election inspector you may need an advanced degree in electrical engineering or even more important, an expertise in computer fraud. Party hacks now have the opportunity to become party hackers.
One of the (other) outcomes of the bedlam that was the 2000 Florida presidential election was a rush to rectify the problems of butterfly ballots and hanging chads that so bedeviled the election officials of the state affectionately known to many of us as America's Foot.
The solution is the DRE - Direct Recording Electronic Voting Machine. Most are computerized touch screen systems not unlike an ATM. They're supposed to be faster, more accurate and efficient. But as with so much of our modern technology, there are dangers and drawbacks that haven't yet been adequately addressed nationwide. There are bugs in the system that could negate your vote and throw elections.
Last October, President Bush signed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), promising nearly $4 billion for states to buy the new electronic voting machines. On the face of it, an excellent idea. But the potential for monumental mischief makes old-fashioned ballot box stuffing seem as innocent as soaping windows or toilet-papering the neighborhood chestnut tree.
In last year's midterm election, Georgia spent $54 million to become the first state to use nothing but touch screens for voting. The results were startling: although the final polls showed the incumbent Democratic governor and Senator Max Cleland winning re-election (Cleland in a squeaker), both were defeated.
As reported by Andrew Gumbel of the British newspaper, The Independent, and others, similar swings took place in several other states. Republicans point to last-minute campaigning by the President, the imminent war in Iraq and other factors, all of which may be true, but the results have many wondering if malfunctioning or rigged electronic machines played a part.
They can only wonder because much of the technology is covered by trade secrecy contracts and information about systems' software is proprietary. Nonetheless, a pattern of lax oversight that could permit malfunctions, sloppy or malicious coding, the insertion of worms, viruses, "Trojan horses" and other outside tampering has emerged. Plus, the methodology for proper recounts remains largely lacking. Some kind of verifiable paper receipt is imperative.
What's more, although the opportunities for political cyber-chicanery are bipartisan, the current, big three DRE manufacturers - Diebold, Sequoia and Election systems and Software (ES&S) have each made large contributions to the Republican Party.
Some are perturbed by a letter Diebold CEO Walden O'Dell wrote inviting Ohio Republicans to a $1000 a plate fundraiser - while Diebold was bidding for the state's voting machine business. In it, he said he was "committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the President next year." (O'Dell has since denied he meant anything to do with Diebold's product. Feel better?)
We all must remain aware and vigilant. Perhaps companies that manufacture the electronic voting systems should be forbidden from making political contributions (I know the First Amendment issues inherent in such restrictions). And New Jersey Congressman Rush Holt has introduced legislation de
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